Future Work

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Often the question, “How can we convince the public to trust scientists?” guides discourse about trust in science. Instead, with growing distrust of scientists among both marginalized groups and conservatives, we should ask, “How can scientists earn the diverse public’s trust?” The answer, I argue, lies in a trait shared by science and democracy: responsiveness. Informed by my decade-long career as a science journalist and empirical studies on science communication, I’m developing what I call the Responsiveness Model of Trust in Science. Pushing back against standard models that ground trust in scientists’ authority as objective knowers (e.g. Oreskes and Conway, 2010), the model aims to foster warranted trust in the many cases when policy-relevant science is uncertain and value-laden. It does so by requiring scientists to respond to alternative hypotheses (epistemic responsiveness) and the public’s values (political responsiveness) to warrant trust. The model also requires journalists to verify whether scientists are being properly responsive, thereby acting as the public’s watchdogs.

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In my dissertation, I use the model to settle a debate in philosophy of science over whether scientists can make value judgments on the public’s behalf and remain democratically legitimate (e.g. Lusk, 2021; Schroeder, 2021). With the help of literature from political philosophy on deliberative democracy, I argue the Responsiveness Model provides a solution that avoids key problems other proposed solutions face (e.g. Mansbridge et al. 2012; Irzik and Kurtulmus, 2019). I also use the model to resolve a debate in political philosophy over whether science should be used to justify coercive policies even if all citizens don’t agree with or understand such science; that is, a debate over whether scientific reasons can be made public in the Rawlsian sense (e.g. Kogelmann and Stich, 2021). I argue they can with journalists’ help. Lastly, combining work in philosophy of science, social philosophy and applied ethics, I use the model to fix a norm conflict between communicating accurately and minimizing harm that arises when journalists report on scientific disagreement. This last chapter, and also my writing sample, was recently published in Synthese. I’ll submit the other two chapters to journals before I graduate.

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In future work, I’ll build on the Responsiveness Model by continuing to explore the roles of trust, communication and expertise in democracy. I outline these endeavors in the first two sections below. As I explain in the third section, I also plan to utilize literature in American pragmatism to understand and help resolve our contemporary democratic problems. Lastly, beyond these activities, I foresee further exploration in applied and social epistemology, as early versions of my dissertation utilized literature in these areas, such as on moral encroachment (e.g. Bolinger, 2020; Gendler, 2011). Overall, my central goal as an academic is to conduct research that helps individuals, organizations and governments uphold deliberative democratic ideals while facing the deep uncertainties associated with the crises we face, especially those related to climate change and public health. 

                                                            

A ‘Morally Decent’ Model of Trust in Science

 

In a series of papers, I’ll integrate a more sophisticated conception of trust into the Responsiveness Model by utilizing seminal work in care ethics that considers the role of vulnerability and power dynamics in trust relationships, namely that of Anette Baier (e.g. Baier, 1995). First, I’ll argue that the trust relationship between scientists and the public is, to use her words, “morally rotten.” Why? Because it has historically relied on concealment on the part of the trusted: Scientists (and others communicating science, especially from positions of power). What has been concealed? The uncertainty and value-ladenness of science. Second, I’ll show how the Responsiveness Model can help foster a “morally decent” trust relationship between scientists and the public, as it requires honesty about policy-relevant science’s often uncertain, value-laden nature. I’ll also argue that with this honesty comes vulnerability to the public, which is essential to rebalancing power between scientists and the public, such that they share a morally decent trust relationship. Third, I’ll argue a central solution scholars propose to rescue trust in value-laden science – that scientists should align their values with the public’s – conflicts with Baier’s conception of trust (e.g. Irzik and Kurtulmus, 2019; Schroeder, 2021). Specifically, it conflicts with her claim that trusting necessitates granting the trusted discretionary powers to make value judgments on one’s behalf. In short, trust entails vulnerability, which this solution neglects. I’ll be presenting this work at the 2024 Philosophy of Science Association meeting. 

 

A Systemic Model of Expertise in Democracy

 

Traditionally, philosophers of science have concentrated on studying local sites of deliberative democracy, thereby neglecting how these sites interact as a system (Lusk, 2021; Mansbridge et al., 2012; however, see Kitcher, 2012). As I already begin to explore in my dissertation, the Responsiveness Model takes a systemic approach to deliberative democracy by integrating how communication by scientists and journalists could interact to cultivate warranted public trust in science. However, the science communication environment extends beyond these two groups. Some of the questions I aim to investigate through both philosophical and empirical research, as well as forays into applying the Responsiveness Model in practice, include: What foundational science education do people need to meaningfully participate in a scientifically informed policymaking process? How can we integrate multiple sources of expertise, including Indigenous and local expertise, in ways that bolster warranted trust in the policymaking process among diverse groups? How, if at all, should we use artificial intelligence to flag or even censor scientific misinformation on social media? How do different media, from museum exhibits to podcasts, differ in their ability to communicate science? In what will ultimately result in a book, I’ll examine these questions and others. 

 

Exploring the Fruits of American Pragmatism

 

Since my research program finds its roots in American pragmatism, I’d like to further explore the fruits of this tradition. For example, I hope to apply Jane Addams’ conception of sympathetic knowledge – that better knowing one another improves moral action – to debates about trust in experts (Addams, 1902). I’ll also explore how John Dewey and Walter Lippmann’s classic debate over democracy’s viability can help us understand and remediate our current democratic crisis (Lippmann, 1922; Dewey, 1927). This latter project could start with a course that examines whether Dewey’s notion of truth is more compatible with democracy than Lippmann’s absolute notion. Lastly, I’d like to investigate how pragmatist ideas have found their way into the ‘adaptive’ approaches to climate policymaking proposed by the Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty (DMDU) community (Marchau et al., 2019). This makes me wonder how else we can mine pragmatism for solutions to the problems we face. In addition to philosophical work on this topic, I’ll pursue collaborations with DMDU researchers and policymakers to better understand their approach and to contribute ideas for practical application.